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I. statement of purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the sensitivity of 
Brazil's balance of payments (including its foreign debt) to 
future changes in world economic conditions. To accomplish this, 
the determinants of the country's balance of payments will be 
isolated and then empirically studied. Based upon these results, 
forecasts will be made under three different economic scenarios. 
The intent will be to determine the affect that different sets of 
world conditions have upon Brazil's foreign debt and trade 
balance from 1987 to 1991. 
The hypothesis of this study is that continued industrial 
country growth, coupled with low world interest rates, will 
produce annual balance of payment surpluses. This will lead to a 
decrease in Brazil's foreign debt over the next five years. On 
the other hand, if interest rates increase, followed by a world 
recession, Brazil will experience significant trade deficits over 
the next five years; this will severely undermine Brazil's 
ability to service its foreign debt over the coming years. 
By way of conclusion this paper will relate the implications 
of Brazil's future balance of payments and foreign debt situation 
to the success of democracy in the country. In addition, some of 
the positive steps that have been taken or that should be taken 
in ameliorating the external economic problem will be discussed. 
They will include, a better understanding of the problem by the 
industrialized countries, a new forum for re-negotiating the 
Latin American debt, and specific policies that the Brazilian 
government can adopt. 
1 
II. Economic History. 1970-1987 
Brazil has the notorious distinction of having the largest 
foreign debt of the developing countries, totaling 105.1 billion 
dollars at the end of 1985. 1 This brief history will address two 
main questions: Why does Brazil have the largest foreign debt of 
the developing countries? What domestic affects has this 
situation had on the country? To begin to answer these two 
questions three powerful external shocks to Brazil's economy and 
to the world economy will be examined. The first of these was 
the oil shock of 1973, which substantially increased Brazil's 
foreign debt and trade deficit. Tne second was the oil shock of 
1979-1980 following the Iranian Revolution, which intensified the 
balance of payments deficit. The final external shock was the 
world recession of the early 1980's. It is interesting to note 
that the two main external shocks occurred in the seventies, 
causing immediate decreases in the rate of growth in most of the 
oil-importing countries, but the crisis in Brazil was only 
evident in 1981. 2 
This section will begin by examining why the crisis took 
eight years (from 1973 to 1981) to affect Brazil, then go on to 
examine what happened to the country from 1982 through early 
1987. During this history it is important to keep in mind that in 
1970 Brazil had a foreign debt of 4.9 billion dollars (or $13 
billion in 1985 dollars) and by the end of 1985, it had a foreign 
debt of 105.1 billion dollars. 3 A real increase of 709% over a 
period of fifteen years (see Graph-1). 
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The main shock to Brazil's economy was the OPEC oil embargo 
of 1973. At the time of the embargo, Brazil was the largest 
importer of oil of the developing countries. oil importing and 
the setting of domestic oil prices is controlled by the Brazilian 
government. However, as the price of oil quickly and 
consistently increased, the Brazilian government did not adjust, 
or even attempt to adjust to the new, higher prices. Instead, 
the government concentrated on sustaining high rates of growth. 
This attitude is clearly evidenced in the Braziiian government's 
Second National Development Plan that was presented to the 
country in 1975. The Plan specified goals of both increasing 
state sponsored investment and the maintenance of a rapid rate of 
growth (see Graph~2). Yet the Plan did not address the issue of 
adjusting to the new, higher oil prices. 4 
The immediate result was that Brazilian imports went from 
6.2 billion dollars in 1973 to 12.6 billion dollars by 1974. 5 A 
large portion of this increase was due to oil imports, which went 
from 986 million dollars to 3.2 billion dollars by 1974 (see 
Graph~3).6 This meant that in a one year time span oil imports 
went from 16% of total imports to 25%. In addition, the rise in 
oil prices increased industrial production costs worldwide, 
leading to sUbstantial increases in world prices which led to an 
increase in level of Brazilian imports. The sharp increase in 
imports was paid for with large increases in foreign borrowing. 
Very convenient for Brazil and the other developing countries was 
the large supply of Petro-Dollars that became readily available 
3 
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through the western banks. The American and European recessions 
that followed the first oil shock led the Western banks to seek 
out new lending markets in which to re-circulate their new Petro-
Dollars. 7 
Many economists argue that the current debt situation is due 
in large part on the over-eagerness of Western bankers to push 
their money, in the form of loans , onto developing nations. 
Although this is a very valid criticism of the bankers, they are 
by no means the only ones at fault. Clearly, Brazil and most 
developing countries were borrowing money willingly to support 
their continued growth at the expense of future generations. 
Therefore, the Brazilian military government deserves as much, if 
not more, of the blame than do the Western bankers. Also, during 
the early nineteen-seventies, low real rates of interest made 
these loans extremely attractive. 8 Yet the rise in the real 
rates of interest during the early part of the eighties, 
increased dramatically the debt servicing burden. This lead to a 
re-assessment of the effectiveness of the huge scale foreign 
borrowing that was undertaken in the seventies. 
In 1973, General Ernesto Geisel became President of Brazil 
(1973-1979) . President Geisel was committed to raising real 
wages (which in fact rose during the 1970's) and to sustaining 
rapid growth. Throughout the seventies, domestic industrial 
costs increased, both because of the rise in fuel prices and 
because of the rise in wages. 9 The rise in costs led to 
increases in consumer prices. This further increased wages, and 
caused the inflation rate to spiral upwards. Furthermore, real 
Brazilian growth was made possible by Brazil ' s avoidance of its 
4 
transfer problem to the OPEC nations, through increased foreign 
borrowing. By doing this, the Brazilian military government 
passed the burden of the increased oil prices and increased 
foreign debt onto future governments and future generations. 10 
It is clear that in many respects the military government's 
economic action was politically motivated: . by maintaining high 
growth rates, the military was able to stay firmly in power (see 
Graph-2) • 
A large proportion of the new borrowed mohey was used to 
modernize Brazil, by investing it in capital-intensive and 
technologically intensive projects. .However, some of this money 
was invested inefficiently in controversial projects. Two 
examples of this were the construction of the nuclear power plant 
in Angra dos Reis and the Trans-Amazonic Highway project. ll 
Nonetheless, with hindsight it has become clear that many of the 
investments made in the seventies, which at the time seemed 
dubious, were in fact very wise and insightful. Two good 
examples of this are the alcohol-fuel program and domestic steel 
product·ion. 
1979-1982 
In 1979, General Joao Figueiredo became President of Brazil 
(1979-1985). During this year Brazilian exports totalled $15.2 
billion and imports totalled $18.1 billion (see Graph-4).12 The 
foreign debt stood at $51.4 billion. At GATT's request President 
Figueiredo removed the government tax incentives and credit 
subsidies to exporters. He also be~an devaluating the currency 
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President's intent was to deflate the currency, making Brazilian 
exports more competitive. The devaluations accelerated Brazil's 
domestic rate of inflation. 13 
During 1978 and 1979, a series of droughts and frosts 
destroyed a large part of the domestic agricultural production. 
Because of this Brazil began importing some of its food staples, 
such as beans and rice, from abroad. To encourage domestic food 
production, the government increased the prices of food . These 
increases boosted the short "run inflationary rate. In addition, 
the fall of the Shah of Iran precipitated the second oil crisis 
which further increased the domestic inflation rate, the foreign 
debt, and the trade deficit. 14 
In 1980, seven years after the first oil shock the Brazilian 
government recognized that the economy was approaching a crisis 
situation, due to Brazil ' s failure to adjust to the oil price 
shocks of the seventies. The government began the year by 
limiting the mini-devaluations to small but frequent increments, 
with the intent of slowing the inflation rate. The government 
strengthened its control over domestic prices, which prevented 
producers from passing on the costs of the devaluations, as well 
as the rising inflation rate, onto the consumers. 15 
By the second quarter of 1980, it was obvious that the 
government would have to take drastic measures to alleviate the 
impending crisis. The government took two main steps: First, it 
substantially reduced expenditures and investment by state-owned 
corporations. This involved reductions of up to 15% in their 
budgets. with the intent of reducing aggregate demand and 
inflation, the government also reduced its spending in other 
6 
fiscal areas . Second, a wage indexing policy, designed to slow 
wage increases, was instituted. The government also temporarily 
eliminated the currency devaluations. 16 
The results of this limited austerity program were fairly 
favorable. Brazilian growth for 1980 remained high; real Gross 
Domestic Product grew by 7.9%. A large part of this growth 
stemmed from an agricultural recovery after the frosts and 
droughts that occurred during 1978 and 1979. In addition, 
industrial production increased because of a strong demand for 
durables. This increase was due to increased inflationary 
expectations and the existence of relatively cheap domestic 
credit. Two serious problems would remain for the coming years: 
the domestic savings rate was declining and inflation was 
increasing. The domestic inflation off-set any export trade 
benefits that might have resulted from the domestic currency 
devaluations. 17 
Recession. 1981-1982 
During 1981 and 1982, the Brazilian government made slowing 
the domestic inflation rate its primary economic goal, even at 
the expense of slower overall growth. To accomplish this goal 
the government used a combination of fiscal, monetary and incomes 
policies. The fiscal measures were designed- to decrease 
aggregate demand. They included: limiting the growth of state-
owned corporations, decreasing government spending on wages and 
fringe benefits, and delaying payment to government suppliers for 
goods that were provided. On the monetary side, the government 
tightened the money supply (only allowing it to grow at a rate 
7 
slower than that of the inflation) , tightened consumer credit, 
and increased the frequency of the currency devaluations. 
Finally, on the incames side, the government re-introduced full 
indexation, tightened its previous wage indexing policy and 
maintained high domestic energy prices. 18 
By the end of 1981, the results of the government's action 
were clearly evident. Real Brazilian GOP decreased by 1.6% over 
the previous period (see G_5).19 Industrial output decreased by 
5.4%, and unemployment reached a high of 9.0%. The exception to 
this downward trend in growth was in the agricultural sector, 
which grew by 6.8% . 20 The outcome for 1982 indicated that 
Brazil's policy of slowing inflation had been successful, with an 
inflation rate down from 110% in 1981 to 91.2%.21 Also, the 
balance of payments situation improved, and Brazil actually 
experienced a trade surplus in 1981, the "first since 1977. 22 
It is notable that Brazil experienced a trade surplus while 
the world economy was in a severe economic recession. The 
questions at this point are how was this achieved and what 
implications does this have for the future balance of payments 
situation? The increase in exports was due to the re-
introduction of export incentives. Also, the weakness in the 
domestic market encouraged Brazilian exporters to look abroad. 
In terms of imports, the decrease in Brazilian growth and an 
effective import-substitution program led to a decline in 
imports. The two factors that had the greatest affect in 
decreasing imports were increased domestic oil production and 
substitution from gasoline to alcohol-fuel (produced from sugar 
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The Brazilian economic situation, at of the end of 1982, was 
characterized by four important events. First, the Brazilian 
debt reached an astoniShing level of 91 billion dollars. 24 
Second, imports were drastically cut. Third, the government 
reduced its investment expenditures. Finally, Brazil, and most 
of the other developing countries were forced to renegotiate 
their foreign debts due to illiquidity problems. 25 Even with 
this pessimistic scenario, the long term outlook for Brazil 
remained very favorable. Brazil's diversified export structure, 
both in terms of the commodities exported and their destinations, 
would be a great asset to the country once the world recession 
ended. 26 Brazil's domestic energy policy began achieving 
impressive results. They included increased domestic fuel 
production, increased alcohol-fuel production, and the opening of 
the Itaipu power plant (the world's largest hydroelectric power 
plant).27 In terms of demographics, as of 1982, the situation 
also looked very favorable. The average population growth rate 
was steadily declining: from 3% in the 1950's to 2.9% in the 
1970's, and finally to an average growth rate of only 2% . in the 
1980's.28 
1983-1984 
At the beginning of 1983 Brazil implemented an austerity 
program designed by the IMF. It was designed to coax the IMF and 
the western commercial banks, involved in international lending, 
to renew lending to Brazil. The program included a 30% 
government imposed maxi-devaluation of the cruzeiro, a reduction 
in the public deficit and new wage restrictions. The wage 
9 
restrictions were designed to slow the inflation rate. They 
prevented wages from increasing as quickly as the domestic price 
index. The devaluation of the currency was designed to increase 
exports, by making their relative prices more competitive, and to 
decrease imports, by increasing the relative prices of imports. 29 
This program convinced the IMF and the western banks that 
Brazil was well on its way towards stabilizing its economy. In 
February, a new lending agreement was arranged. The agreement 
specified that Brazil would receive 5.5 billion dollars from the 
IMF over the next three years, and 4.4 billion dollars from the 
western commercial banks. In addition, 4 billion dollars of 
medium and long-term loans were rescheduled over an eight year 
period. 30 
However, by May, Brazil had fallen behind on its interest 
payments. It became obvious that the country could not mainta'in 
its ambitious austerity program. Therefore, the IMF suspended 
its loan payments from the February agreement, and the commercial 
banks quickly followed suit. 31 
In late June, with the internal political, social, and 
economic situation quickly becoming worse, the government put 
together its own austerity program. The program focused ' 
specifically on the federal budget deficit and the iriflation 
rate. To decrease the deficit, the government substantially 
reduced fiscal spending., This was accomplished by reducing the 
subsidies given to the state-owned corporations. The 
government's intention was to eliminate the budget deficit by the 
end of 1984. with respect to inflation, the government attempted 
to maintain an inflation rate at 5% per month for the rest of 
10 
1983. To accomplish this, a series of five wage control decree-
laws (a decree law is a law that is passed by the President, 
without submitting it to the congress) were imposed;32 but, these 
measures were not effective in slowing the rapidly increasing 
inflation rate (see Graph-7). 
The year ended with the international bankers giving Brazil 
a new loan of 6.5 billion dollars. 33 Although this new loan 
temporarily stabilized Brazil's external economic sector, the 
various austerity programs, implemented during 1983, had some 
very adverse affects on Brazil's political, social, and domestic 
economic situation. The most blatant illustration of the growing 
domestic ills were the supermarket sackings in 1983; there were 
over 900 sackings by the hungry and jobless - or an average of 
three supermarket sackings per day. On the political front, the 
military threatened to end the democratic reforms that were being 
carried out unless President Figueiredo's administration 
stabilized the situation. 34 
During 1984, the government's austerity program began to 
produce considerable improvements to ~e balance of payments 
situation. Exports increased 25%" for the year, and imports 
decreased 10% for the year. By March, Brazil was experiencing 
monthly trade surpluses of approximately 1 billion doll.ars. 
These favorable results allowed the government to liberalize 
imports, thus providing for future growth. 35 Because of the 
increase in exports and the decrease in imports, Brazil 
experienced a current account surplus (its first since 1965) of 
42 million dollars. This occurred only two years after Brazil 
11 
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experienced its worst current account deficit ever, one of 16 
billion dollars. 36 In addition, by the end of the year, Brazil 
paid all of the accumulated arrears on its foreign debt. 37 
The current account surplus resulted in large part from 
Brazil's aggressive import sUbstitution policy, most notably in 
the area of fuel imports. Fuel substitution reduced Brazil's 
dependence on the OPEC countries and contributed to this account 
surplus (see Graph-8). By the end of 1984, Brazil was producing 
50% (500,000 Bls./day) of its oil needs. This was a significant 
improvement over the early 1970's when Brazil produced only 20% 
of its oil needs and had to import the other 80%.38 
Brazil's efforts at substituting alcohol-fuel for gasoline 
were very successful and also served to decrease Brazil's 
dependence on foreign oil. Due to the government's active 
support in the research and production of alcohol-fuel, 
production reached a level of o145,000Bls./day in 1984. In the 
automobile production sector, 80% of the new automobiles produced 
in 1984 were alcohol fueled. 39 
During this period, the gove~nment continued to reduce and 
or eliminate subsidies that it had previously been providing. In 
an attempt to try to further slow inflation, wage adjustments 
were partially de-indexed. Finally, the military government of 
President FigUeiredo opened the way for a civilian president to 
assume the leadership of the country in 1985. 40 
Transition to Democracy. 1985-1987 
After 21 years of military rule Brazil elected its first 
civilian president, Tancredo Neves. On the eve of President 
Neves ' inauguration he underwent emergency surgery and died 
12 
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before being sworn in as President. Jose sarney, the elected 
Vice President, became the acting President of Brazil. 4l 
President Sarney had two main objectives. First, he wanted 
to continue Brazil's political reorganization towards a more 
democratic system. This included direct congressional elections 
in 1986, rewriting the constitution in 1986, and tentative direct 
presidential elections in 1988. Secondly, he redirected the 
government's economic focus from a policy which was traditionally 
oriented towards the external sector, to one that would address 
the country's pressing social and economic problems. 42 
In order to implement his new economic policy, President 
Sarney appointed nilson Funaro, an industrialist from Sao paulo, 
as the new Finance Minister. Funaro included on his staff many 
economists from the non-Marxist left. Had the military still 
been in power, an action such as this one would never have been 
tolerated. Funaro also brought to his job a new ideology about 
Brazil's economy that was significantly different from the one 
that the previous military governments had advocated. It was 
characterized by an unwillingness to submit to IMF programs that 
would slow economic growth, and refusal to slow the inflation 
rate at the cost of increased unemployment. In addition, the 
first economic priority became the domestic economy.43 An 
excellent example of this new ideology was the speech that 
President Sarney gave at the united Nations on September 23 , 
1985: 
Brazil will not pay its foreign debt with 
recession, nor with unemployment, nor with 
hunger •.• a debt paid for with poveilY is 
an account paid for with democracy. 
13 
••• the existing scenario must be re-assessed. 
It must be restructured. BecaUse it is 
unfair. And anything that harbors the germ 
of injustice, of the absurd, cannot survive. 45 
The resulting economic situation for 1985 was not 
surprising, keeping in mind the government's new priorities: 
inflation averaged about 200% for the year and the internal debt 
reached 30 billion dollars. In addition, Brazil achieved an 
astounding 8.3% GDP growth for the year. On the other hand, the 
demand for imports increased because of this high growth. 46 
The year 1986 began very pessimistically for Brazil. During 
the first two months President Sarney's government increased 
fiscal spending considerably, using money that it did not have. 
This led to an increase in the federal budget deficit. The first 
two months also witnessed an increase in the real rates of 
interest, which caused a rapid decrease in industrial investment. 
Inflation reached an astronomical annual rate of 500% for January 
and February. During this period the United states and the other 
industrial countries began pressuring Brazil to adopt an IMF-
backed austerity program. 47 
On February 28, 1986, the Brazilian government took drastic 
measures to alleviate the economic situation. President Sarney 
announced The Cruzado Plan, an economic stabilization program. 
The program was divided into three main objectives: the 
elimination of automatic indexation, the freezing of all prices, 
and the replacing of the Cruzeiro with the Cruzado 'as the 
Brazilian unit of cu~rency. This new currency, the Cruzado, was 
valued at 1,000 times the old currency.48 
The Cruzado Plan had a number of immediate effects on the 
14 
economy, some favorable and others, unfavorable. For the 
consumers, the price freezes significantly increased their 
purchasing power. This led to a massive spending frenzy. 
Compounding the consumption spree was a decrease in the real rate 
of interest. This encouraged people to take their money out of 
savings and spend it on consumer goods. 49 
The unexpected consumption drive brought on many internal 
problems. First of all, the demand for consUmer goods quickly 
outstripped the supply. This led to increased employment, but it 
also created major shortages. By the middle of 1986, shortages 
of beef, milk and other consumer goods became commonplace. 50 
Secondly, many suppliers of parts, raw materials and food 
products began withholding their goods, instead of selling them 
at the depressed prices. In an attempt to discourage this type 
of behavior, the sarney administration imported meat and milk 
from abroad; the administration also imposed a mandatory 
slaughter of domestic cattle. Thirdly, the price freezes, and 
the shortages that resulted, led to a significant rise in the 
"black" market for consumer goods, even at their official place 
of sale. To address this problem, the government published 
comprehensive tables listing the official prices for all consumer 
goods. The consumers were encouraged to "police" the prices, and 
report any irregularities to the government agency which was 
created to address this specific problem. 51 
Finally on November 21, 1986, the Brazilian government came 
out with The Cruzado Plan II, designed to work out the problems 
in the original plan. The new plan increased taxes and cut 
15 
federal expenditures. It also postponed investment in many of 
the state-owned corporations in order to decrease fiscal 
spending. In an attempt to stimulate trade, export incentives 
were re-introduced by the government, in the form of lower income 
taxes for exporters. 52 
To rectify many of the shortage of goods, prices were re-
adj usted and then re-frozen. Finally; to slow the inflation 
rate, the method of determining the inflation index was changed. 
The standard income level, that had previously been used to 
determine the average basket of goods, was upgraded. Therefore, 
an increase in the price of a good in the basket would not have 
as much of an effect on the index of inflation as it previously 
had. 53 
By the end of December, however, two occurrences seemed to 
signal the "untimely death" of the Cruzado Plan: . an average 
annual price increase of 70% for the months of November and 
December, and the re-introduction of full indexation by the 
government. On the external front, the trade surplus fell from 
over $1 billion in July, to monthly surpluses of $100 million for 
November and December. To compound matters, Brazil's foreign 
reserves decreased substantially in these last two months of the 
year. 54 
At present, there is growing concern among Brazilians that 
the government has lost control of the economy. Evidence of this 
is the inflation rate, which increased by 16% during January of 
this year. 55 Because of the deteriorating situation, the near 
term outlook for Brazil has quickly become very pessimistic. In 
addi tion to seeking new loans from its creditors, the government 
16 
is also considering signing what it calls a "social pact", with 
its citizens; This pact would entail a willing attempt by all 
Brazilians to help slow the inflation rate. To do this, workers 
would agree not to ask for wage increases and producers would in 
turn agree not to raise their prices. However, the government 
has not yet proposed a concrete plan on how it will address the 
current situation. 56 
17 
III. The model 
A. Summary 
What follows is an overview of the model used in this stUdy . 
The section following this one will explain in detail the 
procedure used in this model and the results obtained. In the 
third section the data sources will be explained. 
1) XGt = -18.6 + 3.5 OECDt + 1.4 DOLt + .005 Pt 
XGt = Natural log. of exports of goods in year t. 
OECDt = Natural log. of the industrial countries real GDP level in 
year t. 
DOLt= Natural log. of the dollar exchange rate ($/SDR) in year t. 
Pt = Natural log. of world inflation in year t. 
2) XSt = .10 XGt 
XSt = Exports of services in year t. 
3) MNOt = -5.1 + 2.3 BGDPt - 0.7 RAt + 1.4 DOLt - 0.9 Pt 
MNOt = Natural log. of Brazilian non-oil imports in year t. 
BGDPt = Natural log. of the Brazilian real level of GDP in year t. 
RAt = Natural log. of the real domestic exchange rate (Cr./$) in 
year t. 
DOLt= Natural log. of the dollar exchange rate ($/SDR) in year t. 
Pt = Natural log. of world inflation in year t. 
4) MVOq= 107.9 - 1.9 Q 
MVO = Volume of oil imports per quarter (Q) . 
Q= ~ime per quarter . 
MSt = Imports of services in year t. 
MOt = Value of oil imports in year t. 
MNOt = Value of non-oil imports in year t. 
6) Tt = -26.0 + 9.4 Time 
7) DFlt = DFI1985 
Tt = Transfer payments to Brazil in year t. 
DFlt = constant flow of direct foreign investment into Brazil. 
Ht = Natural log. of non-gold reserves in year t. 
Mt = Natural log. of total imports in year t. 
18 
I t = Interest paid on the foreign debt in year t. 
f= Fraction of the debt at fixed interest rates. 
i= Fixed interest rate charged on f. 
rt= Interest rate charged on the variable into portion of the 
debt in year t. 
Dt= Total foreign debt in year t. 
10) a=A1986/(DLT1985) 
a= Constant amortization rate. 
A1986= Net amortization paid on the debt in 1986. 
DLT= Long term debt in 1985. 
The following equations are identities: 
11) Ct = Xt - Mt - It + Tt 
Ct= Current account balance in year t. 
Xt = Total exports in year t. 
Mt= Total imports in year t. 
I t = Interest paid on the debt in year t. 
Tt = Transfer payments in year t. 
12) Lt= -Ct + At + HCt - DFIt 
Lt = Required new net lending in year t. 
Ct = Current account balance in year t. 
~= Net amortization payments in year t. 
HCt = Change in non-gold reserves in year t. 
DFIt = Direct foreign investment in year t. 
13) Dt = (Dt - l - At) + Lt 
Dt = Total foreign debt at the end of year t. 
19 
B. Presentation 
The conceptual basis of this model is derived from William 
Cline, International Debt: Systemic Risk and policy Analysis. 57 
Cline's model forecasts the balance of payments and foreign debt 
of the 19 largest debtor countries. The model that follows was 
adapted to address Brazil's current external economic situation. 
The primary variables of concern are exports and imports of 
goods. However, a complete analysis of the Brazilian situation 
requires looking at all capital flows into and out of Brazil. 
The model presented here includes 13 dependent variables 
(see Table M-1). Seven of these are derived from behavioral 
relationships, and three are obtained directly from identities. 
In addition, two of the variables are estimated as constants and 
one is calculated as an approximation. The results from this 
model will then be used to forecast Brazil ' s external economic 













List of the Dependent Variables 
Definition 
Natural log. of exports of goods · in year t. 
Export of services in year t •. 
Natural log. of non-oil imports in year t. 
Volume of oil imports per quarter. 
Import of services in year t. 
Transfer payments received in year t . 
Direct foreign investment in year t (=DFI1985 ). 
Natural log. of non-gold reserves in year t. 
Interest payments in year t. 
Constant rate of amortization. 
Ct Current account balance in year t. Lt Required new net lending. 

















Exports of Goods 
This equation estimates the elasticity of demand for 
Brazilian exports. It is assumed that the annual supply of 
Brazilian exports equals the demand. The elasticity of demand 
for Brazilian exports is a function of the industrial countries 
real income level, the dollar exchange rate per major currency, 
and the world inflation rate: 
XG= f(OECD, DOL, P) 
The demand for Brazilian exports is a function of the OECD 
countries real income level because the industrial countries 
import approximately 60%S8 of Brazil's total exports. In 
addition, the OECD's real income level influences world growth 
and therefore indirectly affects the demand for the other 40% of 
Brazil's exports. 
The demand for exports is also dependent on the relative 
purchasing power of the dollar. This is determined by the $jSDR 
rate. Finally, export demand is also a function of the world 
inflation index. 
The following equation is estimated by taking the natural 
logarithms of both sides, and the Cochrane-Orcutt technique was 
used. 
i) XGt - -18.6 + 3.S OECDt + 1.4 DOLt + O.OOS Pt 
SE= 3.0 0.8 0.7 0.003 
DW=1.7(using Corc.=Orc.) F-stat(3,21)=Sl R2=.88 
N=26 Yrs.=1960-1985 adjR2=.86 
XGt = Natural logarithm of Brazilian exports of goods in year t. 
OECDt = Natural log. of the industrial countries' real GDP level 
in year t. 
D0Lt= Natural log. of the dollar exchange rate ($jSDR) in year t. 
Pt = Natural log. of world inflation in year t. 
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In order to obtain this export equation a number of other 
independent variables - the real domestic exchange rate and a 
time trend variable - were included in the original estimation 
procedure. But because their t-statistics were insignificant, 
indicating that the parameters had no affect on exports, they 
were not included in the final equation. 
XGs exports of goods 
OECD- industrial countries ' GDP level 
~_united states dollar eXChan.ge rate, $/SDR 
~eal Brazilian exchange rate (Cr./$). 
~ Table M-2 -+~ D R 
Exports of Goods 
(1960-1985) 
Independent Variables Summary 
Statist;i,cs 
Regression · a OECD DOL P RA Time DW adjR2 
(Cochrane-Orcutt technique) 
a-I -19.2 2.4 1.8 1.5 -.15 
~ 
1. 9 .97 
(-2.1) (1. 2) (3.7) (2.1) (-0.9) \ 
a-2 - 13.0 1.0 1.9 1.1 -.15 1.9 . 98 
(-5.2) (2.2) (4.4) (6.5) (-0.9) 
a-3 -18.6 3.5 1.4 .005 1. 7 .86 
(6.1) (4. i) (2.1) (1. 6) 
* In parenthesis are the t-statistics of the coefficients. 
The natural logarithm of exports was regressed on the 
natural logarithms of the following independent variables: the 
OECD countries' GDP level, the dollar exchange rate ($/SDR) , the 
world inflation index, the Brazilian real exchange rate, and a 
term to test for time trends. Because the t-statistic for the 
independent variable time was -0.7 with 21 degrees of freedom (a 
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50% level of significance) there was not enough evidence to 
refute the null hypothesis that time had no affect on exports. 
Time was therefore dropped from equation (a-I) and the export 
equation was re-estimated (eqn. a-2). 
In equation (a-2) the real Brazilian exchange rate (Cr./$) 
did not produce enough evidence, a t-statistic equal to -0.9 with 
22 degrees of freedom (a 40% significance level), to refute the 
null hypothesis that the Brazilian exchange rate had no affect on 
exports. Although, intuitively, the Brazilian exchange rate 
should have had an affect on exports, in Brazil's case, domestic 
inflation increased faster than the currency devaluations. The 
currency therefore appreciated consistently throughout the years 
in question (see Appendix Table A-I); this prevented the 
cruzeiro/Dollar exchange rate from having a significant affect on 
increasing the level of exports. 
The independent variable, Brazilian domestic exchange rate, 
was dropped from equation (a-2) and the export equation was then 
re-estimated. The final result was equation (a-3), which is also 
equation #1. 
r------ In the absence of changes in the independent variables, 
exports will decrease by 18.6% annually. On the other hand, real 
growth in the OECD countries will cause a 3.5% increase in 
Brazilian exports for each percentage point increase in the real 
GDP level. This variable has the most significant affect on the 
demand for Brazilian exports. 
The results show that world inflation will have a very small 
affect on Brazilian exports: 0.005% for everyone percent 
increase in world inflation. However, the affect of changes in 
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the dollar exchange rate ($/SDR) will outweigh the changes in the 
world inflation rate and produce a significant change in exports. 
An increase in the dollar exchange rate ratio ($/SDR) means that 
the dollar is depreciating. In Brazil's case, a 1% dollar 
depreciation will increase the export level by 1. 4%. This 
coefficient provides an indication of the dollars relative 
purchasing power and the geographical distribution of exports. 
If the dollar depreciates, Americans will import less from 
abroad; yet for the Europeans, Japanese, and Canadians, among 
others, it will become relatively cheaper to purchase Brazilian 
goods. Each percentage point depreciation will lead to a 1.4% 
increase in exports. This suggests that the demand for exports 
as a function of the united states dollar is elastic. 
In the next part of this paper, certain assumptions about 
the future world economic situation will be made. These 
assumptions will be inputted into the demand elasticity equation 
in order to forecast the percentage change in exports over the 
next five years. To then convert the resulting percentage change 
into a level of exports, the following equation will be used: 
Where: 
GtE resulting level of exports in year t. 
Gt - l = the level of exports in the year t-l. 
XGt - the percentage change in exports in year t. 
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Exports of Services 
2) XSt= .10 XGt 
Yrs.=1970-1983 N=14 
XSt = Exports of services in year t. XGt = Exports of goods in year t. 
Exports of services can be generalized as a fixed proportion 
of the level of goods exported due to the predominance of 
transportation, shipping, and other service expenditures; these 
expenditures are directly related to the annual level of exports 
(see Appendix Table A-2). This equation was adapted from a model 
used by Carlos von Doellinger. 59 In his model· von Doellinger 
calculates the net payment of services as a fixed proportion of 
trade over time. However, this model estimates the exports and 
imports of services separately. This simplifies the presentation 
of the model and of the forecasts. 
Imports of Goods 
This equation estimates the Brazilian elasticity of demand 
for non-oil imports. It is assumed that the demand for imports 
always equals the supply. The demand for non-oil imports is a 
function of the Brazilian real income level, the real domestic 
exchange rate, the dollar exchange rate ($/SDR), and the world 
inflation index: 
M= f(BGDP, RA, DOL, P) 
The demand for imports is dependent upon the domestic real income 
level. It is also influenced by the relative purchasing power of 
the Cruzeiro (or now the Cruzado) with respect to the dollar. 
In addition, demand for imports will also be influenced by the 
relative value of the dollar with respect to the other major 
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currencies. Finally, demand is also a function of the world 
inflation index. 
3) MNOt= -5. 1 + 2.3 BGDPt - 0.7 RAt + 1.4 00Lt - 0.9 Pt 
SE~ 3.4 0.4 
DW~1.6 (using Corc.-Orc. ) 
N-23 Yrs . -1963-l985 
0.2 0.7 0.3 
F-stat(4,17)=111.5 R2=.96 
adjR2=.95 
MNOt = Natural log. of Brazilian non-oil imports in year t. BGOPt = Natural log. of Brazilian real level of GOP in year t. RAt- Natural log. of the real domestic exchange rate (Cr.j$) in 
year t. 
OOLt = Natural log. of the dollar exchange rate ($jSOR) in year t. Pt = Natural log. of world inflation in year t. 
This equation was estimated taking the natural logarithms of 
both sides and using the Cochrane-Orcutt technique. 
If there are no changes in the right hand variables, imports 
will decrease by 5.1% annually. This occurs because the 
Brazilian government aggressively promotes import substitution 
through. domestic protectionism and import sUbstitution programs . 
An example of the first is the protection granted to Brazil's 
computer industry; an example of the latter is the government 
subsidies provided for alcohol-fuel production. 
Each percentage point increase in the real Brazilian GOP 
level increases imports by 2.3%. Therefore, domestic GOP growth 
of less than two percentage points will not ipcrease the total 
level of imports; this is due to the substitution factor of -5 . 1% 
per year. On the other hand, real domestic GOP growth of a 
magnitude gr eater than 2.2% will require a positive increase in 
imports. Imports are elastic with respect to growth because of 
the need to impo"rt technologically advanced and capital-intensive 
goods in order to sustain growth. 
Because the Brazilian currency appreciated, in real terms, 
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throughout the estimation period (see Appendix Table A-l) , the 
independent variable real domestic exchange rate (RA) had a 
significant affect on increasing the demand for imports. The 
real exchange rate, the Cruzeiro/Dollar ratio, takes into account 
the domestic inflation rate; increases in this ratio denote a 
depreciation of the currency. If the Brazilian currency 
depreciates by 1%, the demand for imports will fall by 0.7%. This 
means that the relative dollar price of foreign goods to the 
Brazilians has decreased, all other things remaining constant. 
Yet, if the currency appreciates (the Cruzeiro/Dollar ratio 
decreases), the demand for imports will increase because 
Brazilians will now be able to purchase more foreign goods. 
Similar to exports, dollar devaluations (increases in the 
Dollar/SDR ratio) will increase Brazil's demand for imports, 1.4% 
for every 1% devaluation. Dollar devaluations indicate the 
relative purchasing power that the dollar has in the world 
markets. Therefore, if the dollar exchange rate depreciates, 
Brazil's demand for imports will increase. 
Finally, increases in world inflation will cause a decrease 
in the demand for imports (-0.9% for each 1.0% increase in world 
inflation). World inflation will increase the price that Brazil 
has to pay for its foreign goods, making it necessary to either 
manufacture some of the goods domestically or to decrease the 
level of imports. 
In order to forecast the future levels of non-oil imports , 
certain economic assumptions will be made in the following 
section. The import demand equation, developed here, will be 
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used to determine the percentage change in non-oil imports during 
the next five years. To convert this percentage change into an 
annual level, the following equation will be used: 
Where: 
Mt= the resulting level of non-oil imports in year t 
Mt_~= the level of non-oil imports in year t-l 
MNOt = the percentage change in imports in year t. 
oil Imports 
4) MVOq= 107.9 - 1.9 Q 
SE= 2.7 0.2 
DW= 1.7 (using Corc.-Orc) F-stat(1,25)=140.3 
Yrs.-1979-l985 (quarterly) N~28 
MVOq= Volume of oil imports (in millions of barrels) per quarter. 
Q= Time (per quarter). 
Cline's model does not take into account the affect that a 
change the in oil price will have upon the import level. The 
volume of oil imported is therefore estimated first, and from 
this the value of oil imports is then calculated. This allows 
different assumptions about future oil prices to be tested. 
In the absence of data on the volume of Brazilian oil 
imports, the assumption is made that Brazil buys all of its oil 
and oil by-products at the official Saudi Arabian petroleum price 
per barrel. This assumption is probably an accurate predictor of 
the actual situation, because Saudi Arabia is the price setter in 
the oil market. Therefore, the price that Brazil pays for oil 
will either be the Saudi price or one that varies simultaneously 
with it. The quarterly dollar value of oil imports is divided by 
the average dollar price per barrel of petroleum, and the result 
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is the number of petroleum barrels imported per quarter from 
1979-1985 (see Appendix Table A-3). 
1979 was chosen as the first year of this estimation because 
the volume of oil imported by Brazil reached a peak that year and 
has since consistently decreased. As the oil import volume 
equation indicates, there has been a definite reduction in oil 
imports during the last seven years. The results show that on 
average oil imports decreased by 1.9 million barrels per quarter 
(see Graph-9). This is due to increased domestic production of 
oil, and the successful alcohol-fuel program. 
To forecast the value of future oil imports the following 
equation was used: 
MOt=MVOt*PB 
MOt = Value of oil imports in year t. 
MVOt- Volume of oil imported in year t. 
PB= Forecasted dollar (price per barrel) of oil in year t. 
The value of oil imports in year t will therefore be equal to the 
volume of oil imported in year t multiplied by the forecasted 
price of oil in that year. This equation is used to test 
different assumptions about future oil prices. 
Imports. of Services 
MSt = Value of services imported in year t. 
MOt = Value of oil imports in year t. 
MNOt - Value of non-oil imports in year t. 
This equation is very similar to that of exports of 
services, and is also adapted from von Doellinger's model. 60 
Similar to the export of services, imports of services can be 
generalized as a constant proportion of the import level due to 
the predominance of transportation, shipping, and other service 
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expenditures that are directly dependent upon the annual level of 
imports (see Appendix Table A-2). 
Transfer Payments 
6) Tt - -26.0 + 9.4 Time 
SE- 28 . 5 2.9 
DWc2.0 F-stat(l,15)=11 . 3 
N=17 Yrs.=1969-1985 
Tt = Transfer payments to Brazil (in millions of dollars) in year 
t. 
Time= Year. 
Transfers are payments that are made to Brazil from 
individuals living abroad or from foreign organizations. 
Examples of this are payments made by expatriates to relatives in 
Brazil and money sent by an organization, such as the Mormon 
Church, to Brazil. Transfer payments to Brazil increase by 9.4 
million dollars annually. Although transfer payments will affect 
the balance of payments situation only ,slightly (the average 
annual level of transfer payments from 1980 to 1985 was only $130 
million) 61, they are included in order to give a complete forecast 
of capital flows into Brazil. 
The data suggested that some type of positive trend existed 
to transfer ' payments over time. Transfer payments were therefore 
originally regressed over the time period 1960-1985 . The results 
were as fOllows : 
Tt = 4.8 + 3.7 Time 
SE= 34.9 2.2 
DW=2.0 (using Corc.-Orc. ) F-stat(l,23)=3.0 R2=.11 
N=26 Yrs.=1960-1985 adjR2=.08 
Because of the poorness of fit to this line (adjR2=.08) and the 
J small t-statistic for the time coefficient (t=1.7), this equation 
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was not used. An estimation was then made using the data for the 
years 1969-1985 which seemed to indicate a more conclusive trend. 
The results for this period showed a more definite and conclusive 
trend. The later years were therefore used for this model. 
Since the ultimate purpose of this model is to forecast, data 
closer to the present should provide a better representation of 
the current situation than data from earlier years. 
Direct Foreign Investment 
DFIt = Direct foreign investment (in millions of dollars.) in year t. 
7) DFIt -1,267 
Direct foreign investment into Brazil was regressed over the 
period 1969 to 1985, but the results were inconclusive in terms 
of predicting DFI: 
DFIt= 789.2 + 63.5 Time 
SE= ~69. 3) (57.1) 




Therefore in the absence of better results, direct foreign 
investment for 1985 (1,267 million do1lars)62 is used as level of 
DFI. It is assumed that DFI stays at this level throughout the 
period being forecasted. 
1-- ' • -
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Non-Gold Reserves 
8) Ht = -2.0 + 1.1 Mt 
SE= 2.3 0.3 
DW=1.6 (using corc.-Orc. ) F-stat(l,23)= 17.8 R2=.44 
N=26 Yrs.=1960-l985 adjR2=.41 
Ht = Natural log. of non-gold reserves in year t. 
Mt= Natural log. of total imports in year t. 
To estimate the affect that changes in the import level had 
on the level of non-gold reserves, the natural logarithm of non-
gold reserves was regressed on the natural logarithm of imports. 
Typically a country will increase the level of reserves that it 
maintains as its imports increase. This provides the country 
with foreign capital that is used to purchase imports. 
Alternatively, if imports decrease a country will generally 
decrease its non-gold reserve level. The results suggest that 
Brazil will increase, non-gold reserves by 1.1% for every 1% 
increase in imports. If imports do not change reserves will 
decrease by 2% per year; also for every 1% decrease in imports, 
reserves will decrease by 1.1% in addition to this original 2% 
decrease. 
Interest Payments 
9) It-(i) (f) (Dt _l )+(rt%+2.0%) [(l-f) (Dt - l ) 1 
I t = Interest paid on the foreign debt in year t. 
f=.2l, Constant fraction of the debt at fixed interest rates. 
i=l1. 4, Fixed interest rat'e charged on f. 
rt=LIBOR, Interest rate charged on the variable interest portion 
of the debt in year t. 
Dt = Total foreign debt in year t. 
This equation is an identity that William Cline devised to 
calculate the interest owed on the foreign debt by a country in 
time period t. The foreign debt is not divided into its short 
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term and long term components, as Cline had done, for the sake of 
simplicity. In addition, Cline subtracted from this equation the 
interest received from Brazil's non-gold reserves. This term 
(interest on non-gold reserves) was not included because it was 
not clear how to determine the interest received on reserves 
during a given year. 
The interest owed on the foreign debt is a function of the 
previous year' s debt multiplied by the current year's London 
Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), plus a2~ point spread. The LIBOR 
rate is used because it is the international lending rate, and 
the rate that determines the interest owed on 79%63 (l-f) of 
Brazil's foreign debt. In Brazil's case the spread, over and 
above the official lending rate, is approximately 2% pOints. 64 
Originally this lending spread was determined as a function of 
the degree of risk that a loan posed; currently, it is more a 
function of a bank's minimum operating costs. 
Twenty-one percent (f) of Brazil's foreign debt, determined 
in the base year 1985, is quoted at fixed rates of interest. 65 
These are loans that were made to Brazil at predetermined 
interest rates and that do not change as the international 
interest rate changes. Both for the sake of simplicity and in 
the absence of comprehensive data on Brazil's foreign debt, it is 
assumed that all of the debt at fixed interest rates is quoted at 
11.4%. This is the average interest rate charged on Brazil's 
foreign debt according to the World Bank. 66 
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Amortization Rate 
a=.Ol, Constant net amortization rate. 
A1986=~954 million, net amortization paid on the debt 
l.n 1986. 
DLT=$95,857 million, long term debt at the end of 1985. 
To estimate the average amortization rate (a) Cline uses the 
above equation. The net amortization paid on the debt in 1986 is 
divided by the long term debt at the end of 1985 (A1986/DLT1985)' 
in order to determine the average rate paid. 67 To then forecast 
the amortization payments, the previous year's long term debt is 
multiplied by the amortization rate (a). It is assumed for the 
forecasts that the amortization rate (a) stays the same during 
the forecasting period. 
Identities Used For Forecasting 
Current Account Balance 
11) Ct = Xt - Mt - It + Tt 
Ct = CUrrent account balance in year t. 
Xt = Total exports in year t. 
Mt = Total imports in year t. 
It= Interest paid on the debt in year t. 
Tt = Transfer payments to Brazil in year t. 
The current account balance measures the flow of dollars 
into and out of the country. It is equal to total exports minus 
total imports (trade balance). Interest payments are then 
subtracted because they involve capital outflows. Finally, 
transfer payments are added back to this equation because they 
are capital inflows·. 
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Required New Lending 
12) Ltz -Ct + At + HCt - DFIt 
Lt= Required new lending in year t. 
At = Net amortization in year t. 
HCt = Change in non-gold reserves in year t. DFIt = Direct foreign investment in year t. 
New lending is a function of the current account deficit, if 
one exists, plus the amortization paid on the debt. Thechange 
in reserves is added to the current account balance because 
decreases in the reserve level will decrease the account deficit, 
assuming one exits. Finally, the level of direct foreign 
investment is subtracted, also decreasing the current account 
deficit. 
It is assumed that if a balance of payments deficit occurs·, 
Brazil will be able to borrow the necessary capital to keep its 
payments in balance. If the right hand side of the above 
equation turns out to be zero, or a negative value, the 
assumption is made that new lending will be zero. It should be 
noted that although Cline neglected to include amortization 
payments in this equation, it is included here because it 
represents an important source of capital outflows that should 
not be overlooked in determining capital flows. 
Foreign Debt 
13) Dt=(Dt - l - At) + Lt 
Dt = Total foreign debt in year t. At= Net amortization payments in year t. 
Lt= New lending in year t. 
The debt at the end of year t will equal the previous years 
debt, less the net amortization paid out, plus any new lending. 
Cline also neglects to take into account the fact that 
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amortization payments reduce a countries' foreign debt. Net 
amortization payments were thus included in this equation (At) to 
better estimate Brazil's future foreign debt. 
C. Data Sources 
For the most part, the data used in this study came from the 
International Monetary Fund, IFS Yearbook 1986. Data was also 
gathered from the specific sources cited in the tables and 
footnotes of this paper. Additional sources were the OECD's, 
National Accounts 1960-1984 (for the industrial countries real 
GDP level), and assorted monthly issues of the IFS (for the 
levels of direct foreign investment into Brazil). Also, the 
Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Latin American 
Economic outlook. Fall 1986, provided updated GDP data, and world 
economic forecasts. The data for the graphs in this paper came 
from the following sources: 
1) G-1 United Nations, ESLA, 1983 and 1975 
World Bank, World Debt Tables 1985-1986 
Brazilian Economic Department, Brazilian Economic Program, 
(Aug. 1986) 
2) G-2 IMF,IFS Yearbook 1986 
Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Latin American 
Economic outlook, Fall 1986 
3) G-3, G-5, G-6, G-7, G-8: 
IMF, IFS Yearbook 1986 
4) G-4 IMF, IFS Yearbook 1986 and February 1987 
5) G-9 IMF, .il:2, assorted monthly editions. 
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IY. The FQrecasts. 1987-1991 
The model developed in the previous section is used to 
forecast Brazil's external economic situation under three 
alternative sets of assumptions about the next five years, 1987 
to 1991. The year 1986 is also forecasted, because updated data 
is not yet available, and for purposes of continuity in the 
forecasting. The results are three different sets of forecasts, 
each based upon different assumptions about the future domestic 
and world economic situation. 
In the first forecast, the base case, the domestic and world 
economic projections made by Wharton Econometric Forecasting 
Associates are used to estimate Brazil's balance of payments 
situation. The results obtained under the base case scenario 
provide the best estimation of what the actual balance of 
payments situation will be during the next five years. 
The second and third projection scenarios are hypothetical 
situations. The second is a pessimistic case, modeled after the 
recession years of the early 1980's. The third is an optimistic 
case which simulates conditions of steady world growth. 
The forecasts are designed not only to predict Brazil's 
future external economic situation, but also to study the 
sensitivity of the balance of payments to specific economic 
changes. This will be accomplished by comparing the resulting 
forecasts from the two extreme scenarios (the pessimistic and the 
optimistic) to the base case forecasts. Finally, the 
implications of these forecasts to the domestic economy will be 
examined. 
For reasons that were explained in the model section, the 
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estimation of three of the dependent variables will not change as 
the projections change. They are transfer payments, direct 
foreign investment (DFI), and the volume of imported oiL 
However, while the volume of oil imported will decrease at a 
constant rate, the value of oil imports will change as the 
forecasted price of oil (per barrel) changes. 
A. Three Scenarios 
1. Base Case 
The assumptions used in the base case come from the e·conomic 
projections made by the Wharton Econometric Forecasting 
Associates. As Table F-l illustrates, the assumptions are 
favorable. Industrial country growth and Brazilian growth will 
be high. While world inflation and international interest rates 
will remain fairly stable. In addition, the price of oil (per 
barrel) will increase slowly over the forecasted period. 
Table F-l 
Base Case Assumptions 
OECD Br. Br. Dollar'" World'" LIBOR 
Growth GDP ex. rate per SDR Infl. lending 
YEAR % ch. %ch. %ch. % ch. % ch. rate,% 
1986 2.5 6.4 -10.1 10.0 9.0 6.5 
1987 3 . 0 5.4 -17.3 5.0 7.0 . 6.5 
1988 2.9 4.6 -0.8 6.0 7.0 7.3 
1989 2.3 4.8 3.4 -0.8 7.0 8.3 
1990 3 . 8 5.7 2.4 -1.4 7.0 · 7.8 










Source: Wharton l conometric Forecast~n 
1Hypothetical data. 
*positive (negative) changes in 
devaluations (appreciations). 
g Associates ( Wharton: Fall 1986 
the exchange rate indicate currency 
Based upon these assumptions, the forecast for Brazil is 
optimistic (see Table F-2). Due to a sustained high level of 
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exports and a stable level of imports, Brazil will experience 
large trade surpluses. Also contributing to this surplus will be 
the decrease in oil imports. 
Sizable annual trade surpluses, coupled with stable interest 
rates will allow the country to pay the interest and principal on 
the foreign debt during 1987, 1988 and 1989. However, in the 
last two years of the forecast, 1990 and 1991, Brazil will 
require small sums of new lending (approximately $250 million 
annually) to continue servicing its .foreign debt. Nonetheless, 
the foreign debt will decrease approximately $4.5 billion dollars 
over the next five years. 
EXPORTS: 
Table F-2 
BASE CASE RESULTS 
(in millions of $'s) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Goods 26,715 26,430 26,426 23,351 21,664 20,827 
%ch. 4.2 (1.1) (0.0) (11. 6) (7.2) (3.9) 
Services 2,671 2,643 2,643 2,335 2,166 2,083 
IMPORTS: 
Goods 8,538 10,257 11,092 10,664 10,458 10,462 
%ch. 23.0 20.1 8.1 (3.9) (1. 9) 0.0 
oil 2,755 2,499 2,327 2,023 1.,645 1,130 
Services 2,710 3,061 3,221 3,045 2,905 2,782 
TRADE BALANCE: 15,383 13,256 12,429 9,954 8,822 8,536 
Transfers 143 153 162 171 181 190 
DFI 1,267 1,267 1,267 1,267 1,267 1,267 
Non-gold Reserves 8,206 9,362 9,858 8,867 8,120 7,502 
FOREIGN LIABILITIES: 
Int. Payments 9,576 9,480 10,037 10,742 10,236 9,919 
Alnort. Payments 1,051 1,041 1,030 1,020 1,010 1,002 
Foreign Debt 104,075 103,034 102,004 100,984 100,201 99,510 
CURRENT ACCOUNT: 5,949 3,928 2,555 (616) (1,232) (1,194) 
Net new lending 0 0 0 0 227 311 
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2. Pessimistic Case 
Under this scenario, the assumption is made that the 
Industrial Countries (the OECD countries) experience a 
recessionary period along with high interest rates (see Table F-3 ) . 
It is assumed that the world recession precipitates a Brazilian 
recession. To make matters worse, the Brazilian currency will 
appreciate (this increases imports). In addition, world oil 
prices will increase substantially, and the dollar will 
consistently appreciate relative to the other major currencies. 
OECD 
Growth 






1991 1.2 I 
I 
Table F-3 
Pessimistic Case Assumptions 
Br. Br. Dollar World 
GDP ex. rate per SDR Infl. 
%ch. %ch. % ch. % ch. 
6.4 -10.1 10.0 9.0 
0.9 -9.0 -7.0 13.1 
-3.2 -12.0 -9.0 15.2 
-1.5 -11.0 -5.0 12.7 
0.2 -2.0 -2.0 11.8 
1.0 1.0 1.0 13.4 



















*positive (negative) changes in the exchange rate indicate currency 
devaluations (appreciations). 
The forecasts under this scenario are shown in Table F-4. 
The OECD recession will decrease the demand for Brazilian exports 
from $20 billion in 1987 to $7 billion in 1991. Nevertheless, 
Brazil will continue to experience small trade surpluses because 
of a $4 billion decrease in non-oil imports over the next five 
years. The domestic recession will cause this decrease in 
imports. 
Due to a significant increase in the international interest 
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rate, and the small trade surpluses, Brazil will experience 
sizable current account deficits. This will force Brazil to take 
out new loans, increasing the foreign debt by approximately $44 
billion over the next five years. The burden of servicing the 
debt will be compounded by the increase in the interest rates and 
by the increase in the level of the debt. 
Table F-4 
PESSIMISTIC CASE RESULTS 
(in millions of U.S. $' s) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 199 1 
EXPORTS: 
Goods 26,715 20,548 14,009 10,922 8,897 7,746 
%ch. 4.2 (23.1) (31.8) (22.0) (18.5) (12.9) 
Services 2,671 2,055 1,401 1,092 890 775 
IMPORTS: 
Goods 8,538 6,974 4,858 3,922 3,268 2,805 
%ch. 23.0 (18.3) (30.3) (19.3) (16.7) (14.2) 
Oil 2,755 3,049 3,058 2,932 2,268 1,577 
Services 2,710 2,406 1,900 1,645 1,329 1,052 
TRADE BALANCE: 15,383 10,174 5,594 3,515 2,922 3,087 
Transfers 143 153 1 62 171 181 190 
DFI 1,267 1,267 1,267 1,267 1,267 1,267 
Non-gold Reserves 8,206 6,896 5,159 4,453 3,719 3,173 
FOREIGN LIABILITIES: 
Int. Payments 9,576 11,700 13,984 16,301 20,431 19,756 
Amort. Payments 1,051 1,041 1,030 1,083 1,189 1 ,342 
Foreign Debt 104,075 103,034 108,260 118,902 134,228 148,895 
CURRENT ACCOUNT: 5,949 (1, 374) (8,229) (12,615) (17,328) (16,480) 
Net new lending 0 0 6,256 11,724 16,516 16,009 
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3. Optimistic Case 
Table F-5 _I. 
OPTIMISTIC CASE ASSUMPTIONS , 
OECD Br. Br. Dollar World LIBOR 
Growth .GDP ex. rate per SDR Infl. lending 
YEAR % ch, %ch. %ch. % ch, % ch, rate,% 
1986 2.5 6.4 -10.1 10.0 9.0 6.5 
1987 4.0 9.0 3.5 3.0 10.0 6.0 
1988 4.5 10.8 4.0 2.0 10.5 5.9 
1989 4.5 8.7 6.0 -1.0 8.9 5.5 
1990 4.8 8.8 7.0 2.0 9.0 6.2 
1991 4.3 8.5 9.0 0.8 10.0 5 .• 8 
Source: H yp othet l.cal data. 
*positive (negative) changes in the exchange rate indicate 










The assumptions made in this case are similar to those made 
in the base case (see Table F-5). Industrial country growth will 
be in the range of 4.5%, and Brazilian growth will average about 
9%. Interest rates will remain stable, while oil prices will 
decrease slightly. In addition, world inflation will remain 
fairly constant, and the Brazilian currency will devaluate 
consistently over the forecasted period. 
The results are presented in Table F-6. The forecast under 
this scenario is very auspicious for Brazil. Exports will 
average about $26 billion per year, while imports will remain at 
approximately $10.5 billion. This will produce annual trade 
surpluses of over $13 billion. 
Stable interest rates will decrease the cost of servicing 
the foreign debt and permit Brazil to amortize a portion of its 
debt. This wil l decrease the level of the debt by $6 billion , 
over the next five years. In addition, Brazil will experience 
current account surpluses in the range of $5 billion. This will 
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provide the country with extra capital to invest in the domestic 
economy. 
Table F-6 
OPTIMISTIC CASE RESULTS 
(in millions of $'s) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
EXPORTS: 
Goods ~ 26,715 26,621 26,622 25,502 25,769 25,155 
%ch. 4.2 (0.4) 0.0 (4.2) 1.0 (:2 • 4) 
Services 2,672 2,662 2,662 2,550 2,577 2,516 
IMPORTS: 
Goods 8,538 9,251 10,203 10,336 10,847 10,876 
%ch. 23.0 8.4 10.3 1.3 4.9 0.3 
Oil 2,755 2,202 1,779 1,434 978 621 
Services 2,710 2,749 2,876 2,825 2,838 2,759 
TRADE BALANCE: 15,383 15,081 14,427 13,457 13, 683] 13,414 
Transfers 143 153 162 171 181's,I'" 190 
DFI 1,267 1,267 1,267 1,267 1,267 1,267 




FOREIGN LIABILITIES: ", ,5'). 
Int. Payments 9,576 9,069 8,897 8,486 
\8: 9~9\ Amort. Payments 1,051 1,041 1,030 1,020 100 
Foreign Debt 104,075 103,034 102,004 100,984 99,974 
CURRENT ACCOUNT: 5,949 6,164 5,691 5,144 4,905 5,051 
Net new lending 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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B. Sensitivity Analysis 
What follows is an analysis of the sensitivity of Brazil's 
balance of payments to changes in economic conditions. This is 
accomplished by comparing the optimistic forecast and pessimistic 
forecast to the base case forecast. The specific world factors 
that will be analyzed are world interest rates, world oil prices 
and changes in the industrial countries income level. The 
domestic changes that will be discussed are the Brazilian GDP 
level and changes in the Cruzeiro-Dollar exchange rate. The 
effects of changes in these factors on the balance of payments 
will then be contrasted with their consequences to the domestic 
economy. It is important to keep in mind that economic 
circumstances which improve Brazil's balance of payments do not 
necessarily also improve the domestic economic situation. In 
fact, tradeoffs between these two situations usually result. 
Brazil's trade balance will be most influenced by changes in 
the industrial countries income level. As is evidenced by the 
optimistic case, steady world growth will produce the largest 
trade surpluses of the three scenarios due to the increased 
demand for Brazilian goods. The implications to the domestic 
economy of steady world growth are favorable. 'The increased 
demand for Brazilian exports will stimUlate the economy; this 
will increase employment and increase the overall income level . 
The drawback to this is that domestic growth will also increase 
the demand for imports, thus reducing the trade surplus. 
Since 79% of Brazil's debt is quoted at a variable interest 
rate, changes in the LIBOR will have a significant impact on 
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Brazil ' s future current account and debt level. I estimate that 
each percentage point increase in the LIBOR. will cost Brazil $840 
million in additional interest payments. If the interest rate 
increases to levels similar to those of the early eighties, the 
interest owed on the foreign debt will approximately double in 
the next five years. This represents an annual difference of up 
to $10 billion (see interest payments in Table F-4) . 
Changes in the world oil prices will not have a significant 
influence on the balance of payments during the next five years. 
In the pessimistic case, the price of oil increased significantly 
over the five years, while in the base case the price increased 
only modestly. Yet the difference in the level of oil imports 
between these two scenarios is small in terms of its overall 
effect on the balance of payments, not more than $900 million. 
Even though low world oil prices will benefit the balance of 
payments situation somewhat, the tradeoff is that they will 
discourage domestic fuel production. 
On the domestic side of the balance of payments situation, a 
slowdown in the Brazilian growth rate will benefit Brazil by 
decreasing the demand for imports. However, the implications 
for the domestic economy will be very adverse : a decrease in 
employment, a decrease in the general standard of living, and a 
li.mit on future economic growth. Changes in the Brazilian income 
level present the most significant tradeoff between the balance 
of payments and the domestic economy. Nonetheless, a comparison 
of the second and third scenarios indicates that it would be 
preferable for the overall economic situation if both imports and 
exports increase rather than for both to decrease. 
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Brazilian currency devaluations will also produce a 
tradeoff. In the short run, a government imposed currency 
devaluation will decrease the level of imports and possibly 
increase the level of exports. This will increase the trade 
surplus. The problem is that currency devaluations will cause 
domestic inflation. This inflation will in turn appreciate the 
currency relative to the dollar, thus eliminating any trade 
benefits from the original devaluation. In addition, the 
original gains to the balance of payments will have to be 
contrasted with the costs to the domestic economy of higher 
inflation. 
It is clear from this set of simulations that certain future 
economic conditions will be more beneficial to both the external 
and internal economic situations than others will be. It is also 
clear that certain combinations of these factors will alleviate 
Brazil's foreign debt and balance of payments situation, while 
other factors will adversely affect the future situation. A 
comparison of the sensitivity of Brazil's balance of payments to 
specific changes illustrates the complexity of the situation and 
the often contrasting implications for the country's future 
domestic economy. -However, the most beneficial circumstances for 
both the balance of payments and the domestic economy will be 
high and sustained industrial country growth rates, together with 
low international interest rates, and steady Brazilian growth. 
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V. Conclusion 
This study illustrates that Brazil's future balance of 
payments and foreign debt situation are very dependent upon world 
economic conditions. The two most important factors affecting 
the situation will be the industrial countries real income level 
and world interest rates. If interest rates remain low and 
growth high, Brazil will experience considerable trade surpluses 
over the next five years. This will lead to an impressive 
improvement in its foreign debt. If on the other hand interest 
rates increa.se, and a world recession ensues, Brazil's debt will 
increase substantially. 
A separate conclusion of this paper is that oil imports will 
have a very minor influence on the balance of trade in the next 
five years, regardless of changes in the price of oil. Although 
the medium term outlook was not specifically examined in this 
paper, the trend in oil imports suggests that it might be 
possible for Brazil to become energy self-sufficient. This 
represents an important break with the seventies and early 
eighties when Brazil was almost entirely dependent on foreign oil 
and when changes in oil prices substantially increased the 
country's foreign debt. 
A. number of positive steps have been taken in addressing the 
Latin American nations balance of payments and foreign debt 
situation. The first is a new overall awareness of the Latin 
American nations' problem. Two examples of this are the Baker 
Plan and the Bradley Plan. 68 Although they advocate very 
different methods for improving the situation, both show a good 
understanding of the problem. Nonetheless, a full understanding 
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of the costs that the monetary policies pursued by the 
industrialized countries, in particular the united states, have 
on the Latin American balance of payments and foreign debt 
situation is still lacking. For example, this study indicates 
that each percentage point increase in the LIBOR will cost Brazil 
approximately $840 million dollars in additional interest 
payments. Factors such as this one must be taken into account 
when the industrialized countries' governments take fiscal and 
monetary action. 
The second important initiative is the Paris Club, an 
informal organization created to provide a forum in which a 
debtor country's government can negotiate its liabilities with 
the creditor banks' governments. 69 If this is successful, it 
will provide a broader economic and political framework for re-
negotiating foreign debts. The Paris Club also seems to signify 
a shift away from defining the debt problem as simply a conflict 
of interests between debtor countries and creditors, to an issue 
with much broader world implications. 
On the domestic front, the Brazilian government must 
continue to emphasize import substitution in order to improve its 
balance of trade; In addition, the country must suppress 
nationalistic pride and aggressively seek out new foreign 
investment. This will provide new inflows of foreign capital, 
and it will stimulate the domestic economy. The government 
should also seriously consider swapping equitx in some of the 
state-owned corporations for portions of the foreign debt; this 
is a new practice known as debt-equity swapping. 70 
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In order for democracy to be successful in Brazil, a number 
of very pressing problems will have to be addressed by the 
Brazilian government. The first is the rapidly deteriorating 
economy; the governments first priority should be to bring the 
economy under control. Second, various pressing social problems 
will have to be dealt with in the near future. They include a 
high rate of unemployment, a high rate of illiteracy, a high 
level of malnutrition, and a widening income gap.7l The success 
of democracy in Brazil will be dependent upon the government's 
ability to manage both the domestic situation and at the same 
time, the balance of payments (including the foreign debt) 
situation. To accomplish this, Brazil will need all the 
political and economic support that the industrialized countries, 
especially the united states, are able to provide. 
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VI. Appendix A - Data Tables 
Table A-I 
Brazilian Exchange Rate 
Exchange Exchange Brazilian Real Exch. 
Rate Rate Wholesale Rate Index 
(Cr/$) index Price index (1980=100 ) 
per. avg. (1980=100) (1980-100) (2)*100/(3 ) 
year (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1960 0.19 0 . 4 0.1 296 
1961 0.27 0.5 0.2 301 
1962 0.39 0.7 0.3 283 
1963 0.58 1.1 0.5 242 
1964 1.25 2.4 1.0 238 
1965 1.90 3.6 1.0 360 
1966 2.22 4.2 2.0 211 
1967 2.66 5.1 2.0 253 
1968 3.40 6.4 3.0 215 
1969 4 . 08 7.7 3.0 258 
1970 4.59 8.7 4.0 218 
1971 5.29 10.0 5.0 201 
1972 5.93 11. 3 6.0 188 
1973 6.13 11.6 7.0 166 
1974 6.79 12.9 9.0 143 
1975 8.13 15.4 11.0 140 
1976 10.67 20.2 16.0 127 
1977 14. 14 26.8 23.0 117 
1978 18.07 34.3 31. 0 111 
1979 26.95 51.1 48.0 106 
1980 52.71 100.0 100.0 100 
1981 93.13 176.7 208.0 85 
1982 179.51 340.5 400.0 85 
1983 577.04 1094.7 1073.0 102 
1984 1848.03 3505.8 3606.0 97 
1985 6197 . 00 11755.9 11860.0 99 
Format: UN, ESLAC. 
Sources: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1986 . 
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Sources: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1986. 







































Volume of oil Imports 
Volume of 
Value of oil Saudi Arabian oil Imports 
Imports Price of (in millions 
(in millions Petroleum of Bls. ) 
of $' s) ($/Barrel) (1)/(2) 
Year (1) (2 ) (3 ) 
1979 
I 1,187 $13.34 89 
II 1,5.03 $14.54 1.03 
III 1,935 $18 • .0.0 1.08 
IV 2,293 $22 • .0.0 1.04 
198.0 
I 2,513 $26 • .0.0 97 
II 2,747 $28 • .0.0 98 
III 2,685 $29.33 92 
IV 2,387 $31. 33 76 
1 981 
I 2,913 $32 • .0.0 91 
II 2,821 $32 • .0.0 88 
III 2,971 $32 • .0.0 93 
IV 3,.018 $34 • .0.0 89 
1982 
I 2,698 $34 • .0.0 79 
II 2,682 $33.29 81 
III 2,833 $33.32 85 
IV 2,664 $33.29 8.0 
1983 
I 2,27.0 $31. 57 72 
II 2,234 $28.56 78 
III 2,277 $28.58 8.0 
IV 2,1.07 $28.5.0 74 
1984 
I 1,B14 $28.6.0 63 
II 2,.06.0 $28.53 72 
III 1,856 $28.53 65 
IV 1,744 $28.23 62 
1985 
I 1,552 $28 • .0.0 55 
II 1,397 $28 • .0.0 5.0 
III 1,515 $27 • .0.0 56 
IV 1,74.0 $27 • .0.0 64 
Source: IMF, IFS, assorted monthly editions. 
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